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NODIS
CHEROKEE EYES ONLY FOR DR BRZEZINSKI

FOL RPT MOSCOW 17596 SENT ACTION SECSTATE DTD 06 DEC 77

QUOTE: S E C R E T MOSCOW 17596

NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HABIB

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: US UR XF
SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF THE UNDER SECRETARY'S CONSULTATIONS WITH
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KOVALEV

SUMMARY INTRODUCTION

FOLLOWING IS A BRIEF OUTLINE OF PRINCIPAL POINTS COVERED
IN ABOUT EIGHT HOURS OF DISCUSSION ON DECEMBER 5 WITH SOVIET
WORKING-LEVEL OFFICIALS ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

THEY PAID RELATIVELY LITTLE ATTENTION TO THE CAIRO MEETING
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AND ACCEPTED MY CHARGE OF NEGATIVISM ON THEIR PART WITH
LITTLE COMMENT. THEY WERE OBVIOUSLY INTENT ON DISCUSSING THE
NEXT PHASE WHICH THEY QUITE CLEARLY SEE AS A PEACE CONFERENCE
AT GENEVA WITH ALL PARTIES REPRESENTED. THEY ARE
PARTICULARLY FEARFUL OF BI-LATERAL DEALS BOTH BEFORE AND DURING
GENEVA. THEY ARE CARRYING A BRIEF FOR THE SYRIAN-PLO REPRESENT-
ATION. WHILE THEY RECOGNIZE THE PROBLEM THE LATTER ISSUE
REPRESENTS, THE SOLUTIONS THEY PROPOSE WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE
TO THE ISRAELIS. THEY ALSO CONTINUE TO FOSTER THE CONCEPT OF
FUNCTIONAL WORKING GROUPS WITH ALL PARTIES REPRESENTED,

BUT THEY DID NOT GIVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS IS AN ABSOLUTE POSITION. THEIR VIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE CO-CHAIRMAN IS DELIBERATELY EXAGGERATED BEYOND ANYTHING REASONABLE AND IS A CLEAR INDICATION OF THEIR DESIRE TO INCREASE THEIR OWN ROLE IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS.

IN SUM, THEY HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY INFLUENCED BY THEIR RECENT SESSIONS WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO CONCERNING PRE-CONFERENCE PROCEDURES AND THE ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE ITSELF. THEIR DOWNPLAYING OF THE CAIRO CONFERENCE WAS NOT CHARACTERIZED BY MUCH VITUPERATION. THEY APPEARED TO ACCEPT IT AS A PHASE TO BE GOTTEN THROUGH AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE BEFORE RETURN TO THE GENEVA FRAMEWORK.

THEY MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT IS UP TO US TO GET THE ISRAELIS AND EGYPTIANS BACK ON THE GENEVA TRACK. WHILE WE MADE IT CLEAR IT WAS UP TO THEM TO EDUCATE THE SYRIANS AND PLO ON REALITIES AND PRACTICAL REQUIREMENTS, AND TO ENSURE THAT REJECTIONISTS DO NOT HAVE ANY SUBSTANTIAL INFLUENCE ON THE PEACE PROCESS. END SUMMARY

1. PRINCIPALS ON EACH SIDE WERE:
 - U.S. SIDE: THE UNDER SECRETARY
- SECRET

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AMBASSADOR TOON

- SOVIET SIDE: DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KOVALEV
- CHIEF OF THE N.E. COUNTRIES DEPT. SYTENKO.

2. SUMMARY OF POINTS MADE DURING MORNING SESSION:
11:00 A.M. - 1:30 P.M.

THE SOVIET SIDE:

- TALKS ARE IN CONTEXT OF U.S.-SOVIET ROLE AS CO-CHAIRMEN OF GENEVA CONFERENCE. WE FIRMLY SUPPORT THIS ROLE AS IS EVIDENT IN THE U.S.-SOVIET JOINT STATEMENT ON THE M.E. THE SOVIET UNION IS PURSUING A SOLUTION IN CORRESPONDENCE WITH U.S.-SOVIET UNDERSTANDINGS, BUT THE SAME CANNOT BE SAID OF THE UNITED STATES;

- PROOF IS IN SADAT'S RECENT INITIATIVES WHICH IF NOT INSTIGATED BY THE U.S. ARE SUPPORTED BY IT. THESE INITIATIVES DISRUPT THE PROCESS TOWARD GENEVA AND ARE AT ODDS WITH THE EFFORTS WHICH SHOULD BE TAKEN BY THE CO-CHAIRMEN;

- THE RESULT OF OUR RECENT CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ARABS AND THE PALESTINIANS IS AS FOLLOWS:

- A) BEFORE SADAT'S INITIATIVES (I.E., BASED ON SYTENKO'S M.E. TRIP)

- THE TALKS WERE DIFFICULT, BUT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE WAS TAKING SHAPE,

- THE PLO WANTED SEPARATE INVITATION TO THE CONFERENCE,

- ALL WANTED THE CO-CHAIRMEN TO PARTICIPATE IN ALL GROUPS AND MEETINGS OF THE CONFERENCE.

B) AFTER SADAT'S INITIATIVES

- THE SITUATION HAS DRASTICALLY CHANGED FOR THE WORSE.

-- WE DO NOT ACCEPT THE U.S. VIEW THAT SADAT'S MOVES HAVE ENHANCED THE BASIS FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, OR THAT THOSE ARABS WHO OPPOSE HIS INITIATIVES ARE "ANTI-PEACE". THE ARABS ARE AGAINST SEPARATE
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DEALS. THIS EVALUATION IS BASED ON OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ARABS AND THE PALESTINIANS AND IS GIVEN ON BEHALF OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP;

-- IF THE SITUATION IS NOT "READJUSTED", THEN THERE ARE NO CONDITIONS FOR RECONVENING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. THE QUESTION IS HOW WILL THE U.S. DISENTANGLE ITSELF FROM THE PRESENT SITUATION? IF THE U.S. IS STILL IN FAVOR OF GENEVA, THEN IT SHOULD PROVIDE THE "NECESSARY CONDITIONS" FOR IT. THE SOVIET UNION WILL WORK IN THAT DIRECTION;

-- WE SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, PAINT THE PICTURE IN TOO DARK A LIGHT. WE ARE NOT OPTIMISTIC, BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO BE TOO PESSIMISTIC.

3. THE U.S. SIDE:

-- WE DO NOT WISH TO DWELL ON THE PAST, BUT SIMPLY TO EXPLAIN HOW WE GOT TO THIS POINT -- WHICH CANNOT NOW BE CHANGED -- AND TO DISCUSS WHERE WE GO FROM HERE;

-- FIRST, COOPERATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION ON A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT REMAINS THE U.S. OBJECTIVE. SECOND, WE WERE NEITHER INFORMED NOR CONSULTED IN ADVANCE ON SADAT'S FIRST DECISIONS. WE WERE INFORMED OF THE CALL FOR THE CAIRO MEETING ONLY SHORTLY BEFORE THE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT;

-- HOWEVER, WE SUPPORT SADAT'S MOVES AND THE CAIRO MEETING BECAUSE THEY CONTRIBUTE TO THE PEACE PROCESS. THE QUESTION IS NOT HOW THE U.S. CAN DISENTANGLE ITSELF, BUT HOW WE BOTH CAN USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM TOWARD PEACE. WE SHOULD LET THE CAIRO MEETING TAKE PLACE TO SEE WHAT HAPPENS AND WE SHOULD FOLLOW THE AGREEMENTS WE HAVE REACHED
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BETWEEN OURSELVES;

-- WE ARE DISAPPOINTED AT SOVIET NEGATIVENESS AND LACK OF ASSISTANCE IN OVERCOMING DIFFICULTIES WITH REGARD TO A M.E. PEACE. THIS IS TRUE WITH RESPECT TO

BOTH THE EFFORTS MADE TO CONVENE A GENEVA CONFERENCE AND TO SADAT'S INITIATIVE AND THE CAIRO MEETING. SUPPORTING THE REJECTIONIST FORCES IS FUTILE AND IS ANTI-PEACE. THESE FORCES DENOUNCE 242 AND 338. SURELY THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT SUPPORT THIS. THE SYRIANS ARE NOT A LOST CAUSE. THEY ARE INTERESTED IN PEACE AND SOVIET INFLUENCE WITH THEM WOULD BE USEFUL IN MOVING THEM FORWARD IN A CONSTRUCTIVE WAY;

-- THE U.S. HAS CARRIED OUT ITS RESPONSIBILITIES VIS A VIS THE SOVIET UNION, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO THE JOINT STATEMENT. WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH YOU OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE PARTIES IN THE REGION ON THE PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE. PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE TOWARD THE ACCEPTANCE OF A UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION;

-- THE "JOINT" ELEMENT IN THE JOINT U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT ON THE M.E. IS CLEAR, BUT THE PARTIES IN THE REGION MUST THEMSELVES NEGOTIATE THE SOLUTIONS TO THEIR PROBLEMS. WE CANNOT IMPOSE IT. THERE IS NO WAY A SEPARATE INVITATION CAN BE ISSUED TO THE PLO. THERE WILL BE NO CONFERENCE IF THERE IS INSISTENCE ON THIS POINT;

-- ONE OF THE REASONS FOR THE VISIT TO MOSCOW IS TO SOLICIT SOVIET VIEWS AND TO ASK THAT MOSCOW UNDERSTAND OUR GOALS AND NOT INTERFERE WITH THE PROCESS WHICH CAN CONTRIBUTE TO PEACE;

-- SECRETARY VANCE WILL VISIT THE M.E. FROM DECEMBER 8 TO DECEMBER 15 FOR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE STATES CONCERNED.

4. SUMMARY OF POINTS MADE DURING AFTERNOON SESSION:

4:00 P.M. - 8:30 P.M.

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THE SOVIET SIDE:

-- WITH REGARD TO THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AT GENEVA. ALL DECISIONS SHOULD BE ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTIES. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN SHOULD PARTICIPATE IN ALL GROUPS AND MEETINGS OF THE CONFERENCE AND WITHOUT THEIR CONCURRENCE, NO DECISIONS WILL BE TAKEN. EITHER WE GO IN THE DIRECTION OF UNANIMOUS APPROVAL OR ONE OF US WILL GO IN THE DIRECTION OF PLAYING UP TO ONE OR ANOTHER SINGLE PARTY. LACK OF UNANIMOUS AGREEMENT WOULD BE A GREEN LIGHT FOR SEPARATE DEALS. A NEGATIVE U.S. RESPONSE ON THIS POINT WOULD MAKE MORE DIFFICULT THE CONVENING OF THE CONFERENCE;

-- THE U.S. SUGGESTION OF THE U.N. REPRESENTATIVE CHAIRING MEETINGS AND WORKING GROUPS SURPRISES US. HOW CAN ONE OF THE OTHER PARTIES CHAIR A MEETING IN THE PRESENCE OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN. WE FAVOR THE CHAIRMANSIPS ROTATING BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION, BUT WE HAVE NO OBJECTION TO

THE UNSYG OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE CHAIRING THE OPENING
PLENARY SESSION;

-- WE BELIEVE THE PLENARY SESSION SHOULD APPROVE
ALL DECISIONS TAKEN BY THE WORKING GROUPS. THE U.S.
STATEMENT TO THE CONTRARY GOES IN A DIRECTION WE
HAD NOT EXPECTED AND WE HOPE THIS IS NOT THE FINAL
U.S. POSITION ON THIS IMPORTANT QUESTION.

-- WE DO NOT AGREE THAT THE PROCEDURE FOR APPROVING
THE PARTIES WAS SET IN 1973. THEN IT WAS AGREED THIS
WOULD BE SUBJECT TO "DISCUSSION" -- THERE IS A
NUANCED DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS AND "APPROVAL";

-- PARTICIPATION BY THE PLO IS NOT A PROCEDURAL
QUESTION, BUT A POLITICAL ONE OF PRINCIPLE. NO ONE
OTHER THAN THE PLO CAN "DESIGNATE" THE PALESTINIAN
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REPRESENTATIVES. WE WOULD PERHAPS NOT OBJECT IF
A MUTUALLY ACCEPTED RESOLUTION OF THIS QUESTION
COULD BE FOUND ON THE BASIS OF THE JOINT U.S.-SOVIET
STATEMENT ON THE MIDDLE EAST, I.E., IF A "FACTUAL
UNDERSTANDING" COULD BE REACHED THAT THE PALESTINIAN
REPRESENTATIVES WOULD BE DESIGNATED BY THE PLO.
THIS VIEW IS BASED ON OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE
PARTIES AND IS A MINIMAL VIEW WHICH WILL TAKE SOME
EFFORT TO BECOME ACCEPTED. OUR OWN POSITION
REMAINS THAT OF SUPPORT FOR THE FULL AND EQUAL
REPRESENTATION BY THE PLO. THE U.S. FORMULA DOES
NOT ENRICH US IN ANY WAY BECAUSE WE WOULD NOT BE IN
A POSITION TO WORK ON OUR FRIENDS ON ITS BASIS.
IF THE U.S. SIDE LEAVES SOMETHING UNSAID, WE HAVE
NO BASIS FOR WORKING IN BEHALF OF THIS FORMULA;

-- AS FAR AS THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONFERENCE IS
CONCERNED, WE BELIEVE THAT SPECIFIC QUESTIONS COULD
BE DISCUSSED IN BOTH THE PLENARY SESSIONS AND IN
THE WORKING GROUPS, AND THE LATTER COULD BE FORMED ON
BOTH GEOGRAPHIC AND FUNCTIONAL LINES. THE MAIN THING
IS THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE
IN ALL WORKING GROUPS ON SOME QUESTIONS OF BROAD
INTEREST, E.G.:

- GUARANTEES,
- DEMILITARIZED ZONES,
- WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS.

WE ARE FOR M.E. SOLUTION AS A PACKAGE, I.E., FOR
THE CONFERENCE WORKING OUT A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

-- WE BELIEVE THE U.S. UNDERESTIMATES ITS ROLE AS
CO-CHAIRMAN. WE HAVE GAINED MUCH EXPERIENCE FROM MORE
THAN A DECADE OF EXPERIMENTS, MANEUVERS, AND SEPARATE
DEALS. THE TIME HAS COME TO SHOW SADAT AND THE
ISRAELIS THEIR PROPER PLACE;

-- WE DO NOT UNDERSTAND THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL

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BASIS FOR THE CAIRO CONFERENCE WHICH HAS COMPLICATED THE SITUATION AND MADE IT WORSE. WE HAVE OFFERED OUR PATH OUT OF THE PRESENT DIFFICULTY;

- AN INVITATION TO THE PLO,
- THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONFERENCE AS WE HAVE OUTLINED IT,
- THE NECESSITY OF REACHING A COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT.

ONLY BY ACTING IN THIS WAY CAN WE RESCUE THE GENEVA CONFERENCE -- ASSUMING THE U.S. WANTS TO RESCUE IT. WE HAVE TRIED TO EMPHASIZE AND TO IMBUE THE U.S. SIDE WITH THE ROLE AND THE POSSIBILITIES AS CO-CHAIRMAN. WITHOUT MUTUAL INTER-ACTION BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S. AS CO-CHAIRMEN, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO REACH AN EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION OF THE M.E. CONFLICT;

-- WE WILL CAREFULLY REPORT THE U.S. VIEWS TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND WE TRUST THE U.S. SIDE WILL DO THE SAME WITH REGARD TO THE PRESENTATION OF OUR VIEWS TO SECRETARY VANCE. WE EXPECT A FURTHER RESPONSE FROM THE U.S. SIDE AS A RESULT OF OUR DETAILED AND SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS.

5. THE U.S. SIDE:

-- THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS AT GENEVA MUST BE DECIDED BY THE PARTIES THEMSELVES. WHILE WE EXPECT TO PARTICIPATE IN ALL WORKING GROUPS, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN SHOULD BE REQUIRED FOR DECISIONS REACHED. THE OTHER PARTIES WILL NOT AGREE TO A VETO BY THE CO-CHAIRMEN AND THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE. BUT SOVIET VIEWS ON THIS WILL BE TRANSMITTED TO SECRETARY VANCE AND A FURTHER SECRET

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EXPRESSION OF U.S. VIEWS MAY BE FORTHCOMING;

-- THERE ARE A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE VARIATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF WHO WILL CHAIR MEETINGS. THIS PROCEDURAL QUESTION SHOULD BE DECIDED IN ADVANCE, BUT BY ALL THE PARTIES, NOT JUST BY THE CO-CHAIRMEN;

-- THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PLENARY SESSIONS AND THE WORKING GROUPS HAS NOT YET BEEN DECIDED. WE SUGGEST THE 1973 FORMULA IN WHICH THE GROUPS KEPT THE PLENARY SESSION "INFORMED". OF COURSE THE PLENARY SESSION NEVER CONVENED THEN. BUT WE CAN LOOK UP THE BACKGROUND OF THIS AND CAN DISCUSS IT FURTHER. THIS NEED NOT CREATE AN INSURMOUNTABLE OBSTACLE.

-- ON THE PALESTINIANS. THE JOINT STATEMENT SPECIFICALLY REFERRED TO THE "PALESTINIAN PEOPLE" AND THE U.S. HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION ITSELF IS TO BE DEALT WITH AT THE CONFERENCE. GENERAL AGREEMENT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED THAT THE UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION WOULD INCLUDE PALESTINIAN ARAB REPRESENTATIVES. BUT NO CONCLUSIONS ON THE PRECISE COMPOSITION OF THE DELEGATION HAVE BEEN REACHED;

-- WE SHOULD PROCEED TO ALLOW THE ARAB DELEGATION TO SELECT ITS MEMBERS AND TO INFORM THE U.S. OF THE IDENTITY OF THESE PEOPLE. THE U.S. WILL INSURE THROUGH QUIET, DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS THAT THE PRESENCE OF INDIVIDUALS WILL NOT BE USED AS AN EXCUSE BY ISRAEL TO AVOID THE CONFERENCE. THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE "FACILITATING" FUNCTION OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN;

-- WE CANNOT AGREE TO THE SOVIET INTERPRETATION ON THE DESIGNATION OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES BY THE PLO. NOR WOULD THE ISRAELIS ACCEPT THAT. IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT THE 1973 FORMULA BE FOLLOWED, I.E., THAT PARTICIPATION IN THE CONFERENCE MUST BE WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES ORIGINALLY INVOLVED. IF THE PARTIES DON'T AGREE, THEN THERE IS NO CONFERENCE. OUR FORMULA IS A CREATIVELY AMBIGUOUS
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ONE AND WE MUST SHOW SOME SOPHISTICATION HERE. HOW THE ARABS SELECT THEIR DELEGATION IS UP TO THEM. IF WE TALK QUIETLY TO THE ARABS, WE CAN MOVE CLOSER TO A SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. WE SHOULD BOTH THINK ABOUT THIS POSSIBILITY;

-- IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO SEND SEPARATE INVITATIONS TO THE PLO. A SUGGESTION WOULD BE TO SEND AN AGREED UPON "CREATIVE" SETTER TO THE UNSYG TO TAKE CARE OF THE PROBLEM. WE WILL HAVE SOME VEJH SPECIFIC IDEAS ON THIS. WE AGREE THAT THIS QUESTION MUST BE SETTLED BEFOREHAND;

-- WE SEE THE STRUCTURE OF THE CONFERENCE ALONG BOTH GEOGRAPHIC AND FUNCTIONAL LINES. THE LATTER COULD ENCOMPAS THE WEST BANK AND GAZA AND PERHAPS ALSO THERE COULD BE A GROUP ON REFUGEES. THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY GUARANTEES, BORDERS, ETC., WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN THE APPROPRIATE GEOGRAPHIC WORKING GROUPS. THE SOVIET IDEA THAT ALL PARTIES COULD PARTICIPATE ON SOME QUESTIONS IN ALL BILATERAL WORKING GROUPS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE, ALTHOUGH THE CO-CHAIRMEN WOULD PARTICIPATE IF THE PARTIES DO NOT OBJECT. HOWEVER, THERE IS NOTHING TO PREVENT THE ARABS FROM AGREEING AMONG THEMSELVES THAT NO AGREEMENTS WOULD COME INTO FORCE UNTIL ALL ISSUES HAD BEEN AGREED UPON;

-- A PACKAGE SOLUTION REQUIRING APPROVAL BY THE PLENARY AND THE CONCURRENCE OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN IS NOT ACCEPTABLE. THERE WILL BE A SERIES OF AGREE-

MENTS, TREATIES, ETC. AGAIN, IF THE PARTIES WANT
TO MAKE THIS CONTINGENT UPON ALL ISSUES BEING SETTLED,
WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION;

-- WE BELIEVE THE ROLE OF THE CO-CHAIRMEN IS
TO BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE PARTIES. WE SEE
PRESENT OPPORTUNITIES FOR OVERCOMING OBSTACLES AND
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WE HAVE TRIED TO WORK FOR THIS;

-- WE WILL CONSULT WITH YOU AFTER THE CAIRO
MEETING. WITH REGARD TO THE MEETING, WE SUGGEST
THAT THE SOVIET SIDE LET IT TAKE PLACE WITH A MINIMUM
OF NEGATIVE COMMENT AND AWAIT THE RESULTS. THEN
WE CAN TALK AGAIN.

6. FINAL NOTE:

DURING THE BREAK IN THE AFTERNOON SESSION KOVALEV,
ACCOMPANIED BY KOMPLEKTOV, ASKED FOR A PRIVATE CHAT
WITH HABIB AND TOON. HE SAID THAT HE WISHED TO PUT
FORWARD A SUGGESTION FOR RESOLUTION OF THE "INVITA-
TION" PROBLEM. HE DID THIS WITH TWO CAVEATS: FIRST,
THAT IT WAS A PURELY PERSONAL SUGGESTION NOT DIS-
CUSSED WITH GROMYKO; AND SECOND, THAT THE SUGGESTION
HAD NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH SYRIA OR THE PLO AND HE
DID NOT KNOW WHETHER IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THEM.
HIS PROPOSAL IS THAT THE SOVIET CO-CHAIRMAN ISSUE
AN INVITATION TO THE PLO TO ATTEND THE GENEVA CON-
FERENCE AND THE U.S. CO-CHAIRMAN WOULD ISSUE A
SIMILAR INVITATION TO LEBANON.

WE TOLD KOVALEV THAT WE HAD SERIOUS RESERVATIONS
ABOUT SUCH A FORMULA. WE WERE SURE THAT A DIRECT
INVITATION TO THE PLO -- FROM ANYBODY -- WOULD BE
TOTALLY UNACCEPTABLE TO THE ISRAELIS. WE FELT THAT
THE "INVITATION" PROBLEM SHOULD BE RESOLVED ALONG THE
LINES OF OUR SUGGESTION MADE EARLIER IN THE
AFTERNOON DURING OUR MEETING. TOON
UNQUOTE VANCE

SECRET

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